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ABSTRACT
YouTube sells advertisements on the posted videos, which in turn enables the content creators to
monetize their videos. As an unintended consequence, this has enabled various illegal activities such
as artificially boosting of views, likes, comments, and subscriptions. We refer to such videos (gaining
likes and comments artificially) and channels (gaining subscriptions artificially) as “collusive entities”.
Detecting such collusive entities is an important yet challenging task. Existing solutions mostly deal
with the problem of spotting fake views, spam comments, fake content, etc., and oftentimes ignore
how such fake activities emerge via collusion. Here, we collect a large dataset consisting of two types
of collusive entities on YouTube – videos submitted to gain collusive likes and comment requests,
and channels submitted to gain collusive subscriptions.
We begin by providing an in-depth analysis of collusive entities on YouTube fostered by various
blackmarket services. Following this, we propose models to detect three types of collusive YouTube
entities – videos seeking collusive likes, channels seeking collusive subscriptions, and videos seeking
collusive comments. The third type of entity is associated with temporal information. To detect
videos and channels for collusive likes and subscriptions respectively, we utilize one-class classifiers
trained on our curated collusive entities and a set of novel features. The SVM-based model shows
significant performance with a true positive rate of 0.911 and 0.910 for detecting collusive videos and
collusive channels respectively. To detect videos seeking collusive comments, we propose CollATe,
a novel end-to-end neural architecture that leverages time-series information of posted comments
along with static metadata of videos. CollATe is composed of three components – metadata feature
extractor (which derives metadata-based features from videos), anomaly feature extractor (which
utilizes the comment time-series data to detect sudden changes in the commenting activity), and
comment feature extractor (which utilizes the text of the comments posted during collusion and
computes a similarity score between the comments). Extensive experiments show the effectiveness of
CollATe (with a true positive rate of 0.905) over the baselines.
1 Introduction
Online media is increasingly becoming the most effective medium for sharing ideas, thoughts, and information. The
primary reasons behind the large user engagement are the ease of accessibility and ever-evolving attractive sharing
facility. The content shared in online media usually includes personal data, documents, photos, and videos. Generally,
videos are used to convey meaningful information in a shorter duration, providing unparalleled advantages to content
consumers. YouTube, an online video-sharing platform, allows users to upload, share, or live-stream videos on the
Internet. Free service, measurable analytics, availability of multiple genres, and access to broad audiences have made
YouTube the most popular platform for both content creators and content consumers. The popularity of a YouTube video
is generally determined by the number of likes or comments it receives over a period of time. Similarly, the popularity
of a YouTube channel is measured by the number of subscribers. The natural way to gain traffic to a channel/video and
make it noticeable is a time-consuming process for content creators. Apart from creating attractive content, oftentimes,
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the content creators become desperate to figure out effective shortcuts to gain quick popularity of their content and
channels. This may lead them to choose unethical and inorganic ways with the aid of blackmarket services to gain
popularity within a short duration. The primary objective of an artificial boosting mechanism is to convince the YouTube
ranking algorithm to prefer a video/channel over its competitors.
In recent years, YouTube has started a YouTube Partner Programme1 where content creators can make money from the
advertisements and other revenue streams. However, the channel has to meet minimum two requirements – at least
1, 000 subscribers and at least 4, 000 hours of watch time within the past 12 months. Furthermore, content creators who
are new to YouTube and have managed to attract only a small audience do not get significant engagement despite having
fantastic content. It leads them to invest to the blackmarket services to reach out to more audiences and increase their
revenues in a faster and effective way. The blackmarket-driven artificial engagement is strictly against the YouTube
Terms of Service and may lead to a permanent ban on the user accounts. To counter this, blackmarket services provide
their facilities in such a way that collusive entities (channels and videos) are evaded from being detected by the in-house
fake detection algorithms deployed by YouTube. Interestingly, in our dataset, we found 7 such collusive channels,
which are marked as verified by YouTube! This clearly shows that YouTube is unable to detect such fraudulent entities,
thereby creating an inadequate social space for the entire YouTube population.
Throughout the paper, we use the following nomenclature. A YouTube video is said to be collusive if likes or comments
of the video are artificially inflated with the help of blackmarket services. Similarly, a collusive YouTube channel is the
one which receives artificial subscriptions from blackmarket services. We use collusive entities to refer to both collusive
videos and channels.
The current work provides a large-scale investigation and detection of collusive entities on YouTube. We create a unique
dataset of collusive entities collected from YouLikeHits (a credit-based freemium blackmarket service). This, to our
knowledge, is the first labeled dataset of YouTube collusive entities. We start our analysis by examining videos submitted
to blackmarket services for collusive appraisals (likes and comments) based on two perspectives – propagation dynamics
and video metadata. We then analyze the collusive channels based on location, channel metadata, and network properties.
In the collusive channel network, the structural properties of the giant component show that it is a small-world. Further,
we are interested in detecting whether a new entity is collusive or not. Since we collected the collusive data directly
from the blackmarket websites, we are sure that the collected data does not have any noisy labels. In such cases, instead
of collecting a large dataset representing the entire YouTube population, we rather focus on designing sophisticated
methods that can leverage the characteristics of entities in one class (collusive in our case) and learn their representations
for the prediction task. Note that we were unable to extract any temporal information related to like and subscription
activities for videos and channels respectively, due to the restrictions and limitations of the YouTube API.
We propose three models to detect three types of collusive entities. The first and the second models utilize one-class
classifiers trained only on the collusive entities using video metadata and channel features to detect collusive videos and
channels respectively. The third model attempts to detect videos seeking collusive comments. In addition to the video
metadata, it uses textual and temporal information of each comment. The temporal information indicates the aggressive
patterns of blackmarket users (as these users aggressively post comments on collusive YouTube videos in order to gain
credits). In addition to this, the semantic representation of each comment enables us to learn the similarity pattern of
these users in posting comments and also to evade the existing fake detection strategies. During the collection of this
dataset, we realized that many videos have a limited number of comments despite being posted for collusive comments
to the blackmarket services. We discarded such videos as the comments were possibly deleted, which might result
in noisy information in the labeled data. Finally, we end up collecting a relatively smaller dataset of videos seeking
collusive comments compared to those videos/channels seeking collusive likes/subscriptions. This further raises another
challenge of learning generalized and robust representation. Thus, by incorporating these properties of blackmarket
users and taking into account the issues mentioned above, we propose CollATe, a denoising autoencoder model to
detect videos submitted in blackmarket services for collusive comments. CollATe consists of three components –
metadata feature extractor, anomaly feature extractor, and comment feature extractor to learn feature representation of
videos.
The first and second models achieve significant accuracy with a true positive rate of 0.911 and 0.910 respectively. The
third model, CollATe achieves a true positive rate of 0.905, outperforming three baselines. Altogether this work sheds
light on how collusion happens on YouTube and focuses on the detection of collusive entities to make YouTube an
adequate video sharing platform for the content creators and content consumers. We believe this could be used to curb
the adverse effects of collusion in gaining artificial social growth. We summarize the contributions of this work as
follows:
1https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/72851?hl=en
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• To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to investigate YouTube videos and channels submitted to blackmarket
services for collusive appraisals.
• We prepare four unique datasets of collusive entities on YouTube: (i) videos submitted to YouTube for collusive
likes, (ii) videos submitted to YouTube for collusive comments, (iii) channels submitted to YouTube for collusive
subscriptions, and (iv) the network of collusive YouTube channels. The dataset is attained using YouTube API and
custom-designed scrapers that can be easily extended and used to collect large YouTube data in an effective way. We
believe that these four datasets would help researchers analyze blackmarket-driven collusive activities happening on
YouTube and develop tools to detect them.
• We analyze the YouTube videos for collusive likes and comments from two perspectives – propagation dynamics and
video metadata. We also analyze collusive YouTube channels based on their location, channel metadata, and network
properties. The giant component of the collusive channel network turns out to be a small-world.
• We utilize one-class classification models to detect videos and channels submitted to blackmarkets for collusive likes
and subscriptions. We also propose CollATe, an end-to-end neural framework to detect YouTube videos seeking
collusive comments.
Reproducibility: Codes and (partial2) datasets are available at the following link: https://github.com/
LCS2-IIITD/CollATe.
Organization of the paper: The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related work.
Section 3 presents a detailed study of the blackmarket services and motivates the research problem. Section 4 discusses
the data collection strategy. Section 5 analyzes collusive YouTube videos and channels. Section 6 introduces the
proposed frameworks to detect collusive entities. The experimental results are presented in Section 7. Section 8 shows
the important implications of the collusive entities detected using our models. Section 9 concludes the paper with future
directions.
2 Related Work
We divide the relevant related work into two parts: (i) fraud/spam detection in online media, and (ii) studies on
blackmarket services.
2.1 Fraud/spam detection in online media
Plenty of studies focused on the detection of fraudulent activities in a wide range of platforms. In recent years,
fraudulent activities are most common in major online media sites such as Facebook [1, 2, 3], Instagram [4, 5] and
Twitter [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13]. [14] presented a review on existing fake and fraud detection strategies in online
media platforms. A number of fake comment detection strategies [15, 16] on YouTube were also proposed in recent
years. Most of these studies rely solely on the textual data of the comment. Nevertheless, there is no prior work that
considers the temporal properties of comments, which in the case of collusion, is the most important factor, the reason
being collusive users perform appraisal operations aggressively in order to gain credits rapidly. [17] proposed LEAS, an
algorithm to detect fake engagements in video sharing platforms using a temporal engagement graph between users and
video objects. [18] proposed a set of tools to detect view fraud in online video portals. [19] investigated the problem of
fake views caused by robots in video sharing platforms.
In the field of fraud detection in online advertising, [20] proposed an advertising network model to discover coalitions
between pairs of fraudsters in e-commerce platforms. [21] designed an automated approach for ad networks to
detect click-spam attacks. [22] analyzed disinformation and crowd manipulation tactics on YouTube by analyzing
video metadata. [23] examined intensive groups among YouTube commenter networks by constructing a two-level
optimization problem for maximizing local degree centrality and global modularity measures. [24] conducted a
longitudinal analysis of the promotion of conspiracy videos on YouTube. [25] studied the problem of injection attacks
on the recommendation systems (fake co-visitations) of YouTube. A number of studies have been conducted on
detecting spam on video streaming platforms. [26] proposed Tubespam, a novel classification model for comment
spam filtering on YouTube. [16] studied the performance of five state-of-the-art text feature selection methods for
spam filtering on YouTube using Naive Bayes and Decision Tree. [27] detected video spammers on YouTube based on
the EdgeRank algorithm to decide which post/stories should appear in each user’s news feed. [28] proposed a spam
detection system for YouTube using a set of spam-related attributes from videos. [29] detected forum spammers on
YouTube based on the mining comment activity log of a user and extracting patterns indicating spam behavior. [30]
2The complete dataset will be made public upon acceptance of the paper.
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detected spam comments on YouTube by showing the effectiveness of using character n-grams instead of word n-grams
to improve the accuracy of the classification model.
More recently, YouTube has become the most important tool for live streamers. In our dataset, we found around 30% of
the collusive channels involved in streaming live videos. [31, 32] discussed the detection of copyright infringement on
YouTube live videos. [31] developed a crowd-sourced based copyright infringement detection (CCID) scheme from
live chat messages on YouTube and Twitch to identify original copyright content from the owner. [32] presented an
end-to-end supervised detection framework to combat copyright infringement in live video streams using the live chat
messages from the audiences. However, these methods tend to combat the problem of fake, fraud, and spam detection
in video-sharing platforms but are not applicable for collusive entity detection.
2.2 Studies on blackmarket services
Despite the fact that a plethora of studies exist on detecting fraud/spam activities in online media, there has been relatively
less work on investigating blackmarket services providing collusive appraisals. [33] focused on how manipulators
create disinformation by fake engagement activities on YouTube. [34] provided a broad overview of the blackmarket
services providing fake YouTube views. The authors reported that one of the blackmarket services, named Devumi had
earned more than $1.2 million in around 3 years of service by selling 196 million views.
Studies that are more related to the current work include [35], [36], and [37], which investigated the problem of
blackmarket-based collusive activities in Twitter. [35] studied multiple types of blackmarket link fraud behaviors in
Twitter by analyzing the connectivity patterns of fake followers via the egonet and boomerang networks. [36] proposed
SCoRe, a supervised method to detect collusive retweeters affiliated to blackmarket services in Twitter. The authors
also showed the differences between fake and collusive activities based on the synchronicity of retweet behaviors. [38]
extended their previous work [36] to show the differences between the working principles of premium and freemium
blackmarket services. [37] proposed CoReRank, an unsupervised method to detect collusive users and suspicious
tweets by leveraging the user’s retweeting and quoting patterns. [39] proposed HawkesEye, a framework to detect
fake retweeters using Hawkes process and topic modeling on tweets. [40] proposed a multi-task learning approach
to detect tweets submitted to freemium blackmarket services. [41] proposed DeFrauder, an unsupervised method to
spot online fraudulent collusive groups in review websites. [42] proposed a review graph model to detect spammers in
online review stores. [43] proposed an automated approach to detect collusion behavior in online question-answering
systems. Other studies identified fake followers on Twitter [44, 45, 46, 47]. [48] and [49] are some of those who used
network-centric properties to detect fake followers. Fake Follower Check3 is one such tool to detect fake followers
based on profile-centric and behavioral features of Twitter users.
To the best of our knowledge, there has been no major attempt to detect collusive entities on video sharing platforms
such as YouTube. Our current effort provides a deeper understanding of the collusive activities on YouTube and focuses
on designing automated approaches to detect these activities.
3 Background and Motivation
3.1 Blackmarket services
Blackmarket services help online media users in gaining appraisals inorganically for their content. They offer services
related to online social networks (Facebook: likes, follow, share; Instagram: likes, follow; Twitter: retweets, likes,
follow), recruitment platforms (LinkedIn: endorsement, recommendations, connections), video sharing platforms
(YouTube: video views, video comments, channel subscriptions; Vimeo: video views, video comments), etc. The
inorganic appraisals help in artificial boosting of online media content, thereby creating an inadequate social space.
Online media entities such as big companies, advertising firms seeking active participation in their promotional
campaigns target these websites to expedite their reach to their target audiences.
The blackmarket services are divided into two types based on the mode of service [50]:
• Premium services: These services charge customers for the facilities they provide. Customers have to register
themselves and opt for one of their plans to gain appraisals.
• Freemium services: These services are free of cost and work like a barter system. The primary goal of
freemium services is to let their customers familiarize with free services and convince them to subscribe to the
premium plans. Most of the freemium services are credit-based, where each customer receives virtual credits
by appraising the content of other customers.
3https://tinyurl.com/y29t3uuu
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Figure 1: An example of anomalous pattern in videos detected by CollATe for collusive (in red) and other videos
(in green). The x-axis displays the time span (in days) starting from when the first comment was posted and y-axis
determines an anomaly score calculated by CollATe. Here, the anomaly score is the Mahalanobis distance computed
using Equation 2 as mentioned in Section 6.3.1. The peak width (horizontal black line) corresponding to every peak
indicates the duration of the peak.
In this work, we focus our analysis on YouLikeHits4, a credit-based freemium service which helps content creators on
YouTube escalate their subscribers, views, comments and likes.
3.2 Collusion on YouTube platform
YouTube is a video sharing platform where users can upload videos by creating YouTube channels. The platform is free
of cost and is operated by two types of users:
(i) Content creators: Users who upload videos to their channel.
(ii) Content consumers: Users who watch videos, interact with videos in the form of likes/comments, or subscribe to
channels.
When a content creator uploads a video, content consumer can perform the following actions –like the video, dislike the
video, comment on the video, share the video, save the video to wishlist, and subscribe the content creator’s channel.
The popularity of a YouTube video is measured by the number of appraisals it receives from the content consumers.
Thus the content creators need to ensure that their content receives high appraisals from the consumers. Moreover, with
the advent of the concept of Monetization on YouTube5, content creators have begun to attract audiences by uploading
videos aimed towards specific genres such as teaching, entertainment, business, etc. This may further motivate them to
choose artificial ways to gain quick popularity in their content. Currently, the earning potential of a channel/video is
solely driven by the number of subscribers/views. When a video is posted on YouTube, it is shared with the YouTube
community of similar channels as recommendations. With millions of videos posted every second, a majority of the
videos go unnoticed to the target audience. The organic way of gaining appraisals is a tedious task, which leads content
creators to opt for an alternative way by means of blackmarket services.
How collusion happens on YouTube? Collusion on YouTube happens when a video or a channel is posted in
blackmarket services for appraisals. In this work, we refer to a user who submits the content to the blackmarket service
as a collusive user. In a freemium blackmarket service, collusive users receive credit points upon performing appraisals
on the content of other collusive users. In the case of YouTube, the majority of the blackmarket services request the
collusive users to submit only the video or channel URL. Collusive users can contribute to the artificial boosting of
YouTube videos and channels in several ways: (i) viewing other videos, (ii) posting a comment on videos6, (iii) posting
likes on a video, and (iv) subscribing to a channel.
4https://www.youlikehits.com/
5https://www.youtube.com/account_monetization?nv=1
6Note that blackmarket services may ban a collusive user upon identifying a spammy comment posted by the user.
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Table 1: Summary of the dataset. Here, the column # unique CC refers to the number of unique content creators of
videos submitted for collusive likes and comments. Entities refers to videos or channels; actions refers to like/comment
for videos and subscription for channels.
Type # entities # deleted # verified # unique CC Max actions Min actions Avg. actions
Vl 45572 15662 342 28702 3151770 0 1333
Vc 25106 1060 86 11752 1008428 0 120
Vs 7847 0 7 − 12935205 0 5378
Fig. 1 shows the peaks observed in collusive videos (in red) for collusive comment appraisals detected using our
proposed approach, CollATe. However, we do not see any such peaks in other random videos (more details can be
found in Section 6.3.3). The reason is that the collusive users tend to perform collusive appraisals aggressively to gain
credit points, which they can use later to add new content. This aggressive nature results in peaks in the inter-arrival
time of appraisals of the collusive entities; however, normal users do not exhibit such behavior.
4 Dataset description
4.1 Data collection
The major challenge is to collect a large set of YouTube videos and channels submitted to the blackmarket services for
collusive appraisals and a contrasting set of videos. We started our data collection by designing multiple web scrapers
for the following purposes – (i) scraping data from blackmarket website (YouLikeHits) and (ii) scraping video related
data (i.e., description, comments) of YouTube videos. Both the scrapers performed their operation independently. We
used Joblib7 library to utilize multiple cores in the deployed server. We also extensively used YouTube API8 for the
following purposes – (i) extracting subscribers of YouTube channels, and (ii) extracting the exact time at which the
comments are posted.
We collected the information of collusive videos from YouLikeHits, a blackmarket service that provides three types of
collusive appraisals – (i) likes to YouTube videos, (ii) comments to YouTube videos, and (iii) subscriptions to YouTube
channels. We queried multiple search engines with keywords such as ‘free YouTube likes’, ‘free YouTube comments’.
Interestingly, apart from links to the websites providing artificial YouTube views and subscriptions, we found a large
number of blackmarket websites pointing to other online media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, Instagram. It
indicates the popularity of blackmarket websites to achieve artificial social status in a much rapid way among online
media users. We developed a scraper to retrieve YouTube entities (videos/channels) involved in collusive appraisals on
YouLikeHits. Interestingly, we observe that some of the collusive videos are propagated by verified YouTube channels.
We found 342 (resp. 86) videos submitted to YouLikeHits for collusive likes (resp. comments). We also found 7 verified
YouTube channels, which are registered in YouLikeHits for collusive subscriptions. While scraping, we found that only
25% of videos for collusive likes and 4.05% of videos for collusive comments are deleted by YouTube’s current fraud
detection system. All the above observations show that YouTube is unable to detect these entities effectively using its
in-house fraud detection mechanism. These insights further motivated us to design efficient methods to detect YouTube
entities that are involved in gaining collusive appraisals with the help of blackmarket services.
We extracted video metadata and comments of all the videos using our custom-designed scrapers and YouTube API.
Finally, we divided the dataset into three unique sets – Vl (videos submitted to YouLikeHits for collusive likes), Vc
(videos submitted to YouLikeHits for collusive comments) and Vs (channels submitted to YouLikeHits for collusive
subscriptions). The entire data statistics is showed in Table 1 and Fig. 2. Note that we did not find any videos which are
common across Vl and Vc.
4.2 Data privacy
To our knowledge, this work is the first effort that aims to analyze YouTube videos and channels submitted to blackmarket
services for collusive appraisals. We emphasize that we will not release the sensitive information (i.e., video ids and
uploader details) when we make the dataset public. The entire data collection process was performed after taking proper
Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval from our institute.
7https://joblib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/
8https://developers.google.com/youtube/v3/
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 2: Distribution of (a) likes of YouTube videos, (b) comments of YouTube videos, and (c) subscribers of YouTube
channels in our dataset.
(a) (b)
Figure 3: Distribution of temporal properties characterizing propagation dynamics – (a) initial delays and (b) lifetimes
of Youtube collusive videos.
5 Analyzing collusive YouTube entities
We analyze the collusive videos from two aspects - (i) propagation dynamics, and (ii) video metadata. In the first part of
this section, we will present the propagation dynamics of collusive videos using two metrics – initial burst and lifetimes.
In the second part, we will show the analysis of the collusive YouTube channels based on location, channel metadata
and network structure.
5.1 Videos submitted for collusive comments/likes
For videos submitted for collusive comments, we extract the video metadata and video comments (full text of each
comment and timestamp at which the comment was posted). Note that due to the restrictions of YouTube API, we are
unable to provide detailed insights of the videos submitted to blackmarket websites for collusive likes. The API only
allows retrieving the total count of likes and dislikes.
5.1.1 Propagation dynamics of artificial boosting
Here we focus on the temporal properties of collusive videos based on two features – initial burst and lifetimes. As the
timestamps of occurrence of like activities are not available with us due to API restrictions, we perform the analysis
only on videos submitted to blackmarkets for collusive comments.
(i) Initial burst: We consider the initial burst as the first time when there is a peak in the arrival rate of comments in a
video. Section 6.3.1 outlines the peak detection technique. Through this analysis, we characterize how rapidly a video
receives collusive appraisals. Fig. 3(a) shows that around 30% of the videos have an initial burst of artificial boosting
(first peak) within 7 days, and around 50% of the videos have an initial burst within the first one month from the date of
posting.
(ii) Lifetimes: Here we consider the lifetime of the collusive activity over a video. We calculate the delay between the
burst of the first peak and the fall of the last peak. Fig. 3(b) shows that about 80% of the videos have lifetimes within 7
days. This illustrates how these videos gain rapid attention through blackmarket services.
7
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Figure 4: Genre-wise distribution of likes, dislikes and comments of collusive videos. Full forms of the labels in the
x-axis are mentioned in Section 5.1.2.
(a) (b)
Figure 5: Wordcloud of titles of videos submitted for (a) collusive comments and (b) collusive likes.
5.1.2 Metadata of collusive videos
Here we analyze the metadata of collusive videos.
(i) Video genres: We observe the distribution of genre of videos submitted to blackmarket services. The common
genres on YouTube are – Gaming (GA), Entertainment (EN), Travel & Events (TE), Film & Animation (FA), Music
(MU), People & Blogs (PB), Autos & Vehicles (AV), Education (ED), Comedy (CO), News & Politics (NP), Howto &
Style (HS), Science & Technology (ST), Sports (SP), Pets & Animals (PA) and Nonprofits & Activism (NA). We plot
the genre-wise distribution of likes, dislikes and comments of collusive videos in Fig. 4. The bars for likes and dislikes
are drawn from the video metadata for collusive likes, and bars for comments are drawn from the video metadata for
collusive comments. As expected, we observe ‘Music’ to be the most popular genre for videos submitted for collusive
likes (63.05%) and comments (69.81%).
(ii) Wordcloud of video title: We show the wordcloud generated from the title of the videos submitted to blackmarkets
for collusive likes and comments in Fig. 5. For clarity, we remove the two-letter words and common stopwords. Here
the font size corresponds to the frequency of the text. We clearly observe the presence of similar keywords such as
promotional keywords like ‘free’, ‘best’, ‘top’, etc. in both the cases. With the presence of these keywords, it is evident
that videos for collusive like/comment appraisals focus on target-specific keywords for quick promotion.
(iii) Uploader authenticity: We also study the authenticity of the uploader of videos for collusive comments and likes.
Surprisingly, we observe that verified users (marked by YouTube) are also involved in gaining collusive appraisals via
blackmarket services (see Table 1).
5.2 Channels submitted for collusive subscription requests
In our analysis thus far, we focused only on YouTube video submitted to blackmarket services for collusive likes and
comments. In this section, we examine YouTube channels submitted to blackmarket services for collusive subscriptions.
(i) Country-wise distribution: Fig. 6(a) shows the world map plot for the country-wise distribution of collusive
YouTube channels (in red color), indicating the count of channels submitted to blackmarket services for collusive
subscriptions. Out of 7, 847 collusive channels, we find 3, 804 channels with no countries mentioned in the profile. In
the remaining set, USA tops the list with 20.11% of collusive YouTube channels followed by Indonesia with 19.58%.
(ii) Metadata of collusive YouTube channels: We show the video, view and subscriber count of collusive YouTube
channels. For better visualization of the distributions, we create custom range of the counts – Low (1 < count < 100),
8
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 6: (a) Country-wise distribution of collusive YouTube channels, (b) distribution of YouTube channels based on
video, subscriber and views, and (c) wordcloud of channel titles.
Table 2: Statistics of collusive YouTube channel network.
# nodes # edges AD* Diameter APL** Density
1320 1396 2.115 19 9.037 0.0016
* - Average degree. ** - Average path length.
Medium (100 <= count <= 1000) and High (> 1000). Fig. 6(b) shows the distribution of video, subscriber and view
count for YouTube channels submitted for collusive subscriptions. We observe that video count and subscriber count
are comparable across all ranges; however, there are too many channels with high view count registered in blackmarkets
for collusive subscriptions. Fig. 6(c) shows the wordcloud aggregated over channel titles. We eliminate common stop
words and two-letter word. Here also, the font size corresponds to the frequency of the text. We observe that collusive
channels have keywords such as ‘game’, ‘tutorial’, ‘music’, etc., corresponding to personal interests, which help them
improve the outreach by connecting with the viewers and subscribers within the same domains.
(iii) Network observations: We study the network structure of collusive channels using social network analysis tools.
First, we create an undirected network – nodes are the collusive YouTube channels, and an edge represents common
subscribers among two channels. We use the YouTube API to collect the subscribers of each channel. Out of 7, 847
channels, we observe only 2, 721 channels with public subscriptions (i.e., end-users can see what channels they are
subscribed to). This forms the node-set in the network. We obtain 2, 650 edges among these nodes. We obtain 168
different connected components from this graph. We consider the final graph to be the maximum connected component
(giant component) with 1, 320 nodes and 1, 396 edges for our analysis. We show various network properties (see Table
2) to better understand the structure of the giant component. We notice that a large fraction of nodes (48.51%) belong
to the largest connected component, which perhaps indicates the barter system in freemium services. The average
shortest path length of the network is 9.037, which is of the order of the comparable random network of the same size
and average degree. Note that the comparable random network is created using the same number of nodes and edges as
that of the collusive YouTube channel graph but with random edge connections. The average clustering coefficient of
the giant component in the collusive channel network is 0.0023, which is an order of magnitude higher than that of
the comparable random network whose clustering coefficient is 0.0016. These two structural properties of the giant
component indicate that the network of collusive YouTube channels is a small-world [51].
6 Detecting collusive entities
In the previous section, we have discussed how collusive videos and channels have an adverse effect on YouTube social
space. Therefore, the question we would like to answer is – can we automatically detect if an entity on YouTube is
submitted for collusive appraisals?
In this section, we discuss the methodology for the detection of videos and channels submitted to blackmarket services
for collusive likes, comments, and subscriptions. First, we will show how we detect videos for collusive likes,
and channels for collusive subscriptions. We pose this problem as a one-class classification problem as the set of
genuine videos is unknown to us9. We utilize several one-class classifiers with the proposed sets of static features
9One can argue that YouTube verified channels/videos might constitute the genuine set. We did not consider them because of the
following reasons. (i) In our dataset, we found 7 verified channels which were submitted to the blackmarkets. Therefore, we were
9
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Table 3: Notations and denotations.
Notation Denotation
TS Time sequence vector of comments
c(i) Cumulative comment count at each timestamp
e Error vector
N (µ, η) Gaussian distribution using the error vectors
a(c) Anomaly score calculated using Mahalanobis distance
η Comment similarity score
P Number of peaks
W Number of windows
q Query comment
C Window comments
g(q) Embedding for the query comments
g(C) Embedding for the window comments
x ∈ X Input data point x in input space X
V Intermediate decoded space
Z Intermediate encoding
y ∈ Y Output label y in labels space Y
xˆ Noisy or corrupted input data point
τ Encoder present in the autoencoder
ψ Decoder present in the autoencoder
Table 4: Abbreviations used throughout the paper.
Abbreviation Description
MFE Metadata Feature Extractor
AFE Anomaly Feature Extractor
CFE Comment Feature Extractor
DAC Denoising Autoencoder Classifier
ARIMA Auto Regressive Integrated Moving Average
WMD Word Mover Distance
for the detection. For the second task, we develop a novel end-to-end framework, named CollATe that leverages
video metadata, anomalous activities and comment similarity for detecting videos for collusive comments. Table 3
summarizes the notations with their denotations and Table 4 summarizes the abbreviation and description used in the
model.
6.1 Features for detecting videos submitted for collusive likes
In this section, we present novel features to characterize videos submitted to blackmarket services for collusive like
requests. In Section 7.2, we show how these features affect the performance of different one-class classification models.
• Activeness (α): We observe that collusive videos generally receive more likes with a relatively small number of
views. We compute the Activeness as the ratio of the total number of likes to the total number of views gained by
the video. It shows the high engagement of content consumer on the basis of likes and views. Fig. 7(a) shows the
distribution of activeness for collusive videos.
• Favorability (β): We notice that collusive videos receive less dislikes even for a large number of views10. We
compute the Favorability as the ratio of dislikes to the sum of likes and dislikes gained by the video. It shows the
likelihood of likes gained by the video. Fig. 7(b) shows the distribution of favorability for collusive videos.
• View-rate (γ): The collusive users may focus on increasing the likes of the videos. However, with the growth in
likes, view count will automatically increase (the reverse is not true though). This unintended growth in views also
helps the content creator to gain complementary collusive views. We compute the view-rate as the ratio of the total
number of views gained by the video to the total number of days since its submission to YouTubey. Fig. 7(c) shows the
distribution of view-rate for collusive videos.
• Video duration (δ): We observe that YouTube videos for collusive comment requests are fairly short length videos
with an average duration of 6 minutes. We consider the length of the video (in seconds) as one of the features for the
collusive entity detection. Fig. 7(d) shows the distribution of video duration for collusive videos.
The final metadata feature extractor ve has the following form:
ve = (α, β, γ, δ) (1)
6.2 Features for detecting channels submitted for collusive subscriptions
In this section, we present the novel features to characterize channels submitted to blackmarket services for collusive
subscriptions. Note that due to YouTube API restrictions, we are unable to collect granular details about the YouTube
channels.
• Hidden subscriber count: It is the number of subscribers the channel receives which are hidden from its profile.
unsure whether all verified entities are really genuine or not. (ii) Verified channels/videos are usually very popular, receiving huge
appraisals from the viewers. Therefore, they may not look like a normal, random YouTube entity and may lead to bias in the dataset.
10Note that the number of dislikes is not complementary of the number of likes, as users who view a video may not make any
action (like/dislike). Therefore, it is not necessary that the sum of likes and dislikes of a video is the number of views.
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 7: Exploratory analysis of features used to characterise videos submitted for collusive likes.
Figure 8: The architecture of CollATe. The green colored network is the metadata feature extractor, the orange colored
network represents the anomaly feature extractor, and comment feature extractor is blue colored.
• Video count: It is the count of the total number of videos present in the channel.
• Subscriber count: It is the count of the total number of subscribers the channel has received.
• View count: It is the total number of views the channel has received.
• Comment count: It is the total number of comment the channel has received.
6.3 Detecting videos submitted for collusive comments
In this section, we present novel features to characterize videos submitted to blackmarket services for collusive
comments. In Section 7.2, we will show the importance of these features. It is known that not all the comments posted
on a video are collusive in nature. This makes it hard to identify collusive comments even for human experts. Our
dataset contains rich social information about YouTube videos such as uploader details, video metadata, channel details,
raw comments text, and comment timestamp. The goal of our proposed model is to transform the data into useful
features and identify the collusive videos.
CollATe comprises three components: (i) metadata feature extractor (vm), (ii) anomaly feature extractor (va), and (iii)
comment feature extractor (vc) as shown in Fig. 8. Once vm, va and vc are derived, they are concatenated to create the
final video representation. The collusive video detector takes the learned representations as input to predict if a video is
collusive. The details of the metadata feature extractor is mentioned in Section 6.1 (we use the same metadata feature
extractor except view-rate (γ)). The reason behind not choosing view-rate is that a popular YouTube video is likely to
have similar view-rate to the collusive one. Two other components are mentioned below.
6.3.1 Anomaly feature extractor
The goal of the anomaly feature extractor is to detect sudden changes in the commenting activity over a video. Such
activities generally continue for a shorter time duration and then stop suddenly. We would like to detect such activities
for a given video to derive useful features. The anomaly feature extractor takes sequential time-series data of comments
11
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as input. To extract the anomalies (peaks) from the time-series data, we employ Gated Recurrent Units (GRU) as the
core module of the anomaly feature extractor. We adapt the idea of stacking recurrent layers for anomaly detection
from Malhotra et. al [50].
Overview: Consider a time sequence vector TS = {c(1), c(2)c(3), . . . c(n)} where every point c(t) ∈ Rm in the time
sequence is a m-dimensional vector {c(t)1 , c(t)2 , c(t)3 , . . . c(t)m }, denoting the cumulative comment count at each timestamp
for a given video. Using the time sequence vector TS, we train a stacked GRU network. This model learns to predict
the next l values for d of the input variables such that 1 ≤ d ≤ m. We take m units in the input layer and d× l units in
the output layer. The hidden layer GRU units are fully connected through recurrent connections. We stack the GRU
layers in a manner that every unit in the lower GRU hidden layer is fully connected with every unit in the hidden layer
above it through feed-forward connections.
We utilize the predicted values for computing the prediction error distribution using which we detect the unusual
comment activities (peaks). The error vector e(t) is defined as e(t) = [e(t)11 , . . . , e
(t)
1l , . . . , e
(t)
d1 , . . . , e
(t)
dl ], where e
(t)
ij
is computed by taking the difference between the actual value of c(t)i and its predicted value at time t − j. We fit
a multivariate Gaussian distribution N (µ,Σ) using the error vectors, where µ and Σ are estimated using Maximum
Likelihood Estimation.
To label the observation as either collusive or non-collusive, we calculate the anomaly score a(c), which is defined as
the Mahalanobis distance between the computed error vector e(t) and the distribution N .
a(c) = (c− µ)TΣ−1(c− µ) (2)
Finally, we concatenate all the observations for a given video time sequence and feed the concatenated sequence to
the find_peaks module of Scipy11 to retrieve the peak width and peak height. Using the same data, we get two useful
features that we pass into the collusive video detector.
(i) Peak count (φ): It is the count of the of peaks detected for a video.
(ii) Average peak area (ω): The average peak area is calculated as the average of the overall area covered by each
peak. After exploratory data analysis, we observe a very clear distinction between the distribution of peak width and
height of collusive and other random videos. The width and height of each peak is calculated using the peak_width
module of Scipy12.
Figs. 9(a) shows the peak count and average peak area for collusive videos.
The final anomaly feature extractor va has the following form:
va = (φ, ω) (3)
Training details: As the idea here is to detect unusual commenting behaviour, we train GRU on Vo (more details on
Vo can be found in Section 6.3.3) which is a set of random videos. Once trained, the model will not be able to generate
patterns similar to collusive videos resulting in higher valued error vector or in simple terms – an anomalous activity. In
our experiments, we noticed that LSTM cell tends to generate multiple peaks for single activity while GRU was able to
mitigate this issue well. For the same, we choose to employ GRU cells in place of LSTM cells [50]. Moreover, we
could also reduce the model training time substantially using the GRU cells in place of the LSTM cells.
6.3.2 Comment feature extractor
YouTube users generally comment on videos if either they like/dislike the video or the domain of interest is the same.
On the other hand, the collusive users are majorly interested in uplifting their credits just by posting a large number
of comments. We observe that they tend to borrow the content from the recently posted comments, make marginal
changes and post the same. We hypothesize that the comments posted during artificial boosting should have high textual
similarity between the collusive comments.
To this end, we measure the similarity of closely related comments posted during the boosting timeline. We extract full
comment texts of all the videos using the YouTube API. The data collection strategy is detailed in Section 4.1.
Window selection strategy: Computing a similarity score by utilizing all the previously posted comments for a given
query comment might seem intuitive but is a computationally heavy task. For the same, we first retrieve the comments
posted during peak time. Moreover, we propose to use a fixed-size (w) moving window and roll it over the set of
11https://docs.scipy.org/doc/scipy/reference/generated/scipy.signal.find_peaks.html
12https://docs.scipy.org/doc/scipy/reference/generated/scipy.signal.peak_widths.html
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(a) (b)
Figure 9: (a) Exploratory analysis of the features used for anomaly detector in case of collusive videos. (b) Linear
pattern between subscribers and views of YouTube channels i.e., channels with more subscriptions tend to lead to more
views.
retrieved comments. We define the last comment in each set as query comment (qi) and the other comments as the
window comments (Ci). The best performing window size (w) from the experiments was found to be of size 10.
Comment similarity score (η): To calculate comment similarity score, we first encode both the query comment qi and
the window comments Ci using Universal Sentence Encoder (USE) [52]. As we know that collusive users can belong to
different geographical places and may not use the same language, we chose to work with the multilingual USE model13
to retrieve comment embeddings. In the literature, USE based model has been able to achieve state-of-the-art for
SemEval-2017 Task [53] on Semantic Textual Similarity Multilingual, and Cross-lingual Focused Evaluation. Currently,
the multilingual model supports 16 different languages and has shown strong performance in cross-lingual text retrieval.
The input to the model can be variable length text in any of the supported languages and the output is a 512-dimensional
vector. We transform each query comment into a fix-length embedding vector g(qi) and the window comments into set
of vectors g(Ci) using USE.
It has been observed that the same video was posted multiple times for the collusive comments. It may also happen
that the collusive user ran out of credit points due to which the collusive video is no longer shown on the blackmarket
website until the user again starts earning some credit points. In such cases, our peak detection strategy is likely to
detect multiple peaks (p) for the videos (V ). Moreover, a peak can have a large number of comments. We define the
comment similarity score (η) for a given video as follows:
η =
∑P
i=1 Ps(i)
P
(4)
Ps(i) =
∑W
j=1 maxj:wj∈P (g(qj) · g(Cj)T )
W
(5)
where Ps(i) denotes comment similarity score for ith peak, P denotes the number of peaks, W denotes the number of
windows, and g(qj) and g(Cj) denote the jth query embedding and jth window embedding respectively. We choose the
maximum of the dot product of query embedding and the sentence embedding under the assumption that one comment
is derived from only one other comment.
We use the derived score η along with the total comment count (tc) to create vc. The final comment feature extractor vc
has the following form:
vc = (η, tc) (6)
We then concatenate the learned representations from the metadata feature extractor ve, anomaly detector va and
comment feature extractor vc to form the video feature representation denoted as v = ve ⊕ va ⊕ vc.
6.3.3 Collusive video detector
Here we introduce the collusive video detector, as shown in Fig. 10. The primary purpose of the detector is to
learn the distribution from the collusive data and identify similar ones. Although this task looks very similar to the
tasks mentioned in Sections 6.1 and 6.2, it actually uses a different kind of features by incorporating the temporal
representation of the comments. To investigate this, we manually collected a small set of YouTube channels that are
13https://tfhub.dev/google/universal-sentence-encoder-multilingual/1
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Figure 10: The architecture of Denoising Autoencoder Classifier.
not posted on YouLikeHits. We call this set of videos Vo. Here, we only considered collecting the other set of videos
(Vo) from the top 5000 channels because YouTube channels with more subscriptions tend to lead to more views, thus
resembling the collusive channels. Although it is not possible to find out view-timestamp from the YouTube API for
any given video, we can still expect the overall behavior of Vo to be similar to Fig. 9(b); as a user-driven blackmarket
service is analogous to a channel in a few ways, such as both benefit from more subscribers, the subscribers are loyal
and tend to watch/like/comment on the videos posted. We selected a playlist from each channel at random. From each
playlist, we randomly selected k (where, k=3 in our case) videos. As the overall data was biased towards some specific
genres, we removed some videos at random to maintain generality in data. The presence of such similar patterns in
both the classes increases the difficulty of the classification task even further but will make the classifier more relevant
for real-world collusion detection. Here, Vo contains videos having similar comment growth patterns and thus can
be considered a noisy/adversarial set in terms of comment growth patterns. Note that it does not represent the entire
YouTube population. For the same, we report the true positive rate (TPR) of the model with respect to the set of
collusive videos.
Training a fully connected network that directly optimizes only the supervised objective by gradient descent also does
not work very well in such cases. What works better is to initially use a local unsupervised criterion to pre-train each
layer, with the goal of learning to produce a useful higher-level representation from the lower-level representation output
by the previous layer. From this initial point, gradient descent on the supervised objective leads to better solutions in
terms of generalization performance [54, 55].
We propose to use Denoising Autoencoder Classifier (DAC), which uses autoencoders, a deep unsupervised learning
method that improves the generalization of supervised learning on limited labeled data. In particular, we investigate
a case where the input signal is noisy and we explore the multi-task learning with two tasks: a classification output,
coupled with a reconstruction output of a Denoising Autoencoder. To establish the effectiveness of this approach, we
also present a comparison of this approach against different baselines, including a multi-layer perceptron (MLP) model
as a replacement of the Denoising Autoencoder (more details in Table 6).
Throughout this section, we define the input space as X, input data point x ∈ X, label space as Y, output label y ∈ Y,
intermediate decoded space V, intermediate encoding z ∈ Z, noisy or corrupted input data point xˆ ∈ X.
At a high level, DAC consists of two structural components: the denoising autoencoder, and the dense layer as the
classifier. Denoising autoencoder has a very similar structure to the autoencoders, except rather than reducing only
the reconstruction loss over the input data, it maps noisy inputs to original clean inputs. Autoencoders consist of two
components: an encoder (τ : X =⇒ Z) and a decoder (ψ : Z =⇒ X) where τ and ψ are inversely related. They
first map an input x ∈ X ∈ Rd to an intermediate representation z ∈ Z ∈ Rd′ of reduced dimensionality (d′ < d)
via τ . This intermediate representation is then reconstructed back to a point x′ in the input space, and the difference
between x and x′ is measured using a loss function L.
On the contrary, in case of denoising autoencoder, a noisy representation of x, xˆ, is fed to the network yielding xˆ′, and
then xˆ′ is compared to the original clean input data point x. The classifier utilizes the intermediate representation z of
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the denoising autoencoder. After encoding noisy input, the classification task is added that contributes to the encoder
weights independently from the decoder. This task consists of a fully-connected layer that predicts the label y′ ∈ Y .
Finally, both the classification loss and reconstruction loss propagate backward and contribute to encoder weights.
Training details: We consider a fully-connected autoencoder with two hidden layers for all the experiments. We
use mean squared error as the loss function difference between x and xˆ′. To generate corruption in training data, we
randomly corrupt the input data by ±10% of its original value. We use the entire unlabeled training set, 1384 videos -
756 collusive and 628 random videos, to train the denoising autoencoder for 25 epochs and minimize mean squared
error (MSE) from the reconstruction output. During this stage, we do not update the weights for edges between the
encoded layer and classification output. The denoising autoencoder classifier is then trained to minimize the categorical
cross-entropy loss on the labeled training samples for 150 epochs. Note that we choose the optimal value of each
parameter based on the hyperparameter search.
7 Experimental results
7.1 Baselines for detecting videos submitted for collusive comments
We validate the performance and robustness of CollATe by comparing with five baselines. Since there is no existing
research dealing with the same problem present in this paper, we develop a few of our own baselines and adopt some of
the existing studies to our problem setting. We report the performance of all the competing methods along with the
detailed analysis of the performance and robustness.
• Extractor models: CollATe uses the combination of metadata, anomaly and comment feature extractors.
Thus, we propose two baselines: (i) considering only one extractor at a time (B1), and (ii) considering two
extractors at a time (B2). This also provides the ablation study of our method.
• Variant of proposed model (B3): As shown in Fig. 8, comment feature extractor and anomaly feature
extractor can be modified to obtain a variant of CollATe. We modify both the components to obtain different
variants of the proposed model as described below:
LSTM-based Anomaly Extractor: We replace LSTM units in place of GRU for detecting the anomalous
comments. We observe that this variant tends to generate multiple peaks for the videos with only one-
time collusive comments. This change not only adds the noisy comments but also deteriorates the overall
performance significantly as the comment feature extractor is dependent on this stage.
WMD-based Comment Similarity Score: Word Mover’s Distance (WMD) [56] is a popular metric for calculating
semantic similarity at a document level. We utilize standard pre-trained Word2Vec embeddings from Gensim
library14 to compute the Word Mover’s Distance dij . We transform the distance dij into a similarity score sij
as below:
sij =
1
1 + dij
(7)
where i denotes the comment index, and j denotes the window index. Rest of the details for computing η
remains the same as mentioned in Section 6.3.
There are two major differences between this model and CollATe – (i) word-level vs. sentence-level embed-
dings, and (ii) monolingual vs. multilingual support. We discuss the impact of these differences through our
experiment results in the next section.
• DetectPV (B4): We use the method proposed by Bulakh et al.[57] as our fourth baseline. It uses a supervised
learning approach to identify fraudulently promoted videos by extracting features from the video metadata.
We wanted to check if video metadata-based fraudulent video detection techniques would be useful to detect
collusive videos on YouTube.
• ARIMA (B5): Since CollATe uses temporal information of comments posted on videos to detect peaks and
their associated properties, one may argue that a time series based anomaly detection method may be able to
detect collusive videos. To this end, we consider the method proposed by [58] as another baseline. ARIMA is
an auto-regressive integrated moving average model that uses the combination of auto-regression and moving
average to detect anomalies on time-series data.
7.2 Prediction results
Tasks 1 and 2: Identify the videos (channels) submitted to blackmarket services for collusive likes (subscrip-
tions).
14We tried with glove-twitter-200 and word2vec-google-news-300 embeddings and found the latter to perform better.
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(a) (b)
Figure 11: Feature importance considering (n-1) features at a time, i.e., dropping each feature in isolation (a) for Task 1
and (b) Task 2.
Table 5: Performance of one-class classification models on two tasks. Task 1: videos submitted for collusive likes; Task
2: channels submitted for collusive subscriptions.
Model Task True positive rate
One-class SVM Task 1 0.911
Task 2 0.910
Isolation forests Task 1 0.902
Task 2 0.906
Minimum covariance determinant Task 1 0.900
Task 2 0.901
Local outlier factor Task 1 0.899
Task 2 0.894
Due to the restriction of the YouTube Data API, we are unable to access the timestamp of like/dislike activity. This
resists us to create any time-centric features for collusive like appraisals. Similarly, we are unable to get detailed
information about YouTube channels from the API. For our prediction task, we use one-class classification models
with the features mentioned in Sections 6.1 and 6.2. The models are trained on one class, which in our case is the
collusive class. Note that we only report the true positive rate (TPR) for our prediction task as we are only interested
in the proportion of actual positives that are correctly identified by the model. We perform the prediction task with
the following state-of-the-art one-class classifiers: one-class SVM [59], isolation forests [60], minimum covariance
determinant [61], and local outlier factor [62]. All the scores are reported after 5-fold cross validation. Note that the test
set remains same across all the competing methods.
Table 5 reports the performance of the one-class classification models for detecting videos submitted for collusive likes
(Task 1) and channels submitted for collusive subscriptions (Task 2). In the former task, we observe the best accuracy of
the model (with true positive rate of 0.911) with one-class SVM. To analyze the influence of each feature, we perform
experiments, taking (n− 1) features at a time, i.e., dropping each feature in isolation. The most important feature turns
out to be view rate based on quantified relative importance. In the latter task, we once again observe that one-class SVM
performs the best (with true positive rate of 0.910). View count turns out to be the best feature for this task. Fig. 11
shows the feature importance for Task 1 and Task 2 with the relative TPR drop percentage when we drop each feature
in isolation.
Task 3: Identify the videos submitted to blackmarket services for collusive comments.
Our third task is to determine whether a given video was submitted to blackmarket services for collusive comments. We
use the approach explained in Section 6.3 to detect if a video is collusive. Table 6 shows that DAC consistently achieves
better accuracy compared to its baselines. In Table 6, we mark the best performing extractor for each of the baselines,
B1, B2 and B3 in bold.
Here, CFE-USE denotes the usage of Universal Sentence Encoder while CFE-WMD denotes the usage of Word
Mover’s distance for calculating sentence similarity. CFE-USE (comment similarity and comment count) with DAC is
individually the best performing extractor for baseline B1. Although we expect AFE to perform better than at least
MFE, due to the nature of the non-collusive video data, it does not. These results support our argument about the higher
similarity in the distribution for both collusive and non-collusive datasets. For the same, we take into account multiple
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extractors that not only improvise the performance but also increase the robustness. B2 (MFE + CFE-USE) with DAC
outperforms other permutations as it captures the most useful representation for classification.
B3 (CFE-WMD) seems to perform better than a few baselines but is unable to outperform CollATe. This is expected
because WMD-based similarity score calculation depends on word-level embeddings rather than sentence-level
embeddings. Moreover, we also find that the feature importance is evenly distributed in CollATe compared to B3. [63]
also suggested that the weight vector of a robust classifier should be distributed as evenly as possible. Finally, we report
the baseline performance of B4 (DetectPV) and B5 (ARIMA). We observe that the overall performance of CollATe is
better than the baselines.
Table 6: Performance comparison of CollATe with baselines for detecting videos submitted for collusive comments.
Method True positive rate (TPR)
B1 (AFE) 0.715
B1 (CFE-USE) (MLP) 0.789
B1 (MFE) 0.825
B1 (CFE-USE) (DAC) 0.866
B2 (MFE + CFE-USE) (MLP) 0.792
B2 (MFE + AFE) 0.795
B2 (AFE + CFE-USE) (DAC) 0.875
B2 (MFE + CFE-USE) (DAC) 0.881
B3 (AFE + MFE + CFE-WMD) (DAC) 0.866
B4 (DetectPV) 0.829
B5 (ARIMA) 0.768
CollATe 0.905
8 Interesting Observations
In this section, we detail the important implications of collusive entity detection task. To this end, we consider only the
top 10% of the collusive entities detected (true positive) using our models to present our analysis. For tasks 1 and 2, the
top 10% is generated using the scoring function of our best-performing one-classification model. For task 3, the top
10% is generated using the softmax values present in the last layer of CollATe. We use the term highly collusive to
refer to the collusive entities present in the top 10% in each of the cases.
OBSERVATION 1 (Highly collusive videos have high video ratings): We define rating as the ratio of likes to the
sum of likes and dislikes gained by the video – the video will have rating 1 if there are no dislikes. We observe that
highly collusive videos have very high ratings with an average rating of 0.931. This shows how blackmarket services
have been able to gain collusive appraisals in an effective way.
OBSERVATION 2 (Highly collusive videos have very short video duration): We note that highly collusive videos
have a very short duration, with average video length of only ~4 minutes. As confirmed by YouTube15, it itself promotes
videos that keep people on YouTube for a long period of time. Thus, videos with short duration do not get the proper
audience naturally, thereby making the authors choose blackmarket services to gain artificial appraisals in a quicker
way.
OBSERVATION 3 (Gaining collusive likes does not guarantee to gain collusive comments): We observe that the
videos submitted for collusive likes do not have many comments in them, with the average number of comments being
only 12.4. This also corroborates with the fact that we do not have any intersection between the sets Vl and Vc. We can
ensure that collusive like requests and collusive comment requests are two completely independent activities on the
blackmarket platforms.
OBSERVATION 4 (Highly collusive channels are popular channels with a large number of videos): We note that
highly collusive channels are popular YouTube channels with average subscribers count of 39, 477, average view
count of 8, 762, 188, and average videos count of 111. The reason is that getting new subscribers for those channels
is an extremely difficult task, which makes them choose artificial ways of gaining new subscribers by means of the
blackmarket services.
15https://youtube-creators.googleblog.com/2012/08/youtube-now-why-we-focus-on-watch-time.html
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 12: Example of (a) collusive video (for likes), (b) collusive channel (for subscriptions), and (c) collusive video
(for comments) detected by our models. Sensitive information are blurred.
OBSERVATION 5 (Highly collusive videos have a moderate inter-arrival rate of comments): We study the inter-
arrival rate of comments in the highly collusive videos. Surprisingly, we observe a mean inter-arrival rate of ~5 hours
for each comment. The possible reason behind such high value of inter-arrival rate is due to the expiration of credits for
the collusive comments in the blackmarket services.
Fig. 12 shows the snapshot of some collusive entities detected using our models. Fig. 12(a) shows a collusive YouTube
video where the number of views is much lesser than the number of likes. This clearly gives us the indication that the
YouTuber is buying artificial likes from the blackmarket websites. Fig. 12(b) shows a collusive YouTube channel where
the description clearly states that the author is looking for quick popularity. The YouTube is maintaining a timeline
of the increase in the subscriber count of the channel. Also, the channel description contains promotional keywords
such as ‘gaining more subscribers’. Fig. 12(c) shows a collusive YouTube video where the video has more number of
comments than the views and likes. This also gives us the indication that the YouTuber is buying artificial comments
from the blackmarket websites.
9 Conclusion and Future Work
With the increase in the involvement of content creators and content consumers on YouTube, social growth has become
the most important metric for popularity. To achieve rapid social growth, a large number of content creators go against
the stream by registering their videos/channels to blackmarket services for collusive appraisals. Although many studies
have been carried out to detect fraud and fake activities on multiple online media platforms, identification of collusive
entities remains a relatively important unexplored area of research. The major contributions of this work are manifold.
(i) We collected a large dataset of YouTube videos submitted to blackmarkets for collusive likes, comments and
subscriptions. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first dataset of this kind. (ii) We analyzed the collusive videos
from two perspectives: propagation dynamics and video metadata. The YouTube channels are analyzed based on their
location, video metadata and network properties. (iii) In order to detect videos submitted in blackmarket services for
collusive likes and channels submitted for collusive subscriptions, we utilize one-class classification models trained only
on the collusive data. The SVM-based model achieves 0.911 TPR using video metadata features and 0.910 TPR using
channel features to detect videos and channels submitted to blackmarket services for collusive likes and subscriptions
respectively. (iv) We then proposed CollATe, a system that combines three feature extractors (metadata, anomaly and
comment) to learn representations of a video. CollATe makes use of extractors effectively for identifying whether a
video is registered in blackmarket services for collusive comment appraisals. Extensive experiments on our dataset
show that CollATe is effective in detecting collusive entities with 0.905 TPR. (v) As a final contribution, we show the
important implications of the collusive entity detection task. We expect this research to push further studies in online
media outlets to explore the dynamics of collusive behavior.
Despite encouraging results, collusive entities detection still remains a challenging problem with many open research
questions. In the future, we are interested in exploring the following avenues. First, we plan to take into account the
sentiment of the comments by considering the average comment sentiment during collusion for detecting the collusive
activity. Second, we wish to study the interdependency of the collusive videos and collusive users that can help in
identifying the core users of the blackmarket services. Third, we intend to detect collusive entities at an inter-platform
level as well. Fourth, our final goal will be to design a web-based scalable collusive entity detection system for online
video sharing platforms.
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